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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
COMMENTARY 
Ralph Michael Stein* 
During the past year, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit decided a number of significant appeals involving consti- 
tutional issues. As is generally the case, most of the issues 
presented to the Second Circuit were also under judicial scrutiny 
in other federal appellate courts. Four first amendment cases de- 
cided by the court - three dealing primarily with freedom of 
religion and a fourth with freedom of the press - are particu- 
larly noteworthy and merit review. 
A. That Crsche in Scarsdale 
Believing that both freedom of speech and freedom of reli- 
gion were transcendental concerns, the architects of the first 
amendment to the United States Constitution placed the tmo 
subjects together as the first guarantees in the Bill of Rights.l 
While a plain reading of the amendment would suggest that the 
two subject areas - speech and religion - were discrete, con- 
temporary first amendment litigation often results in a fusing of 
these two areas of constitutional concern. Such a situation was 
encountered in McCreary v. Stone? 
In mid-1984, the Second Circuit, without dissent, reversed 
the district court in McCreary v. Stone, a case of some public 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Lnw. The nuthor ndmowl- 
edges with appreciation the aid of research assistant Anne Schnible and the antribu- 
tions of Donald L. Singer, Class of 1985, in Constitutional Low Seminnr Nine-0. 
See L BRANT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN AND ~ ~ N D I G ,  passim (1965). 
739 F.2d 716 (2d Ci. 1984). afd by an equally diuided Cowt sub nom Board of 
Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985). 
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controversy and also a case fairly typical of recent challenges in 
courts throughout the United States to publicly supported and 
often publicly financed displays of religious symbols in public 
places. McCreary v. Stone was ffirmed without an opinion by 
an equally divided Supreme Court on March 27, 1985.3 In view 
of this disposition, the analysis of the three-judge Second Circuit 
bench4 is of interest. 
Big constitutional issues from little local issues grow. The 
background of McCreary is a story of traditional local govern- 
ment practices confronted by shifts in constituency and the in- 
exorable impact of evolving first amendment doctrine even in 
the smallest villages. The Village of Scarsdale (Scarsdale), a mu- 
nicipal corporation: is located in Westchester County north of 
New York City. Scarsdale6 owns a small park called Boniface 
Circle, "located in the center of the business district of 
Scarsdale."' 
Two separate actions were brought in 1983 to compel Scars- 
dale's Board of Trustees to permit the continued display of a 
creche during the Christmas season. These lawsuits were the cul- 
mination of a history of permitted display, followed by doubts as 
to the constitutionality of the display, followed by a refusal to 
permit the creche in the future. It was this refusal by the Board 
of Trustees that led directly to the commencement of the ac- 
tions in the district court.8 
Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. Ct. 1859 (1985). Justice Powell did not 
participate in the decision. Id. 
McCreary was before Judges Mansfield, Pierce and Pratt in the Second Circuit. 
McCreary, 739 F.2d a t  718. The village has about 17,000 residents, who elect local 
government through a non-partisan system. Id. 
Scarsdale and Scarsdale Post Office cover two political entities. The Village of 
Scarsdale is a municipal corporation, while parts of the contiguous post office of Scar- 
sdale, N.Y., are within the political jurisdiction of the Town of Greenburgh. Although it 
is not clear from the opinion, some of the plaintiffs appear to have Scarsdale Post Office, 
instead of Scarsdale Village, addresses. As this was never raised, i t  was not at  issue in 
this suit. It may be, however, that one or more of the individual plaintiffs lnckod stand- 
ing to bring an action protesting a decision by the Village of Scarsdale authorities. 
McCreary, 739 F.2d a t  717. 
The Citizens' Group, consisting of 17 Scarsdale residents, commenced an action in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on February 7, 
1983, after the Scarsdale authorities denied their application to place a creche at  Boni- 
face Circle. The Creche Committee commenced its action on April28,1983 in the same 
fonun. The two actions raised the same issues and ultimately were consolidatcd. Id. at  
721-22. 
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A creche, depicting the birth of Christ? was first installed in 
Scarsdale's Boniface Circle in 1956.1° A Creche Committee com- 
posed of Scarsdale churches," later a plaints in one of the ac- 
tions in this controversy, was responsible for commissioning the 
sculpting of the wood-carved creche itself and its placement and 
maintenance in Boniface Circle each Christmas season. No pub- 
lic money financed the sculpting of the creche.12 The Second 
Circuit detailed the history of the Scarsdale creche display as 
follows: 
In each year from 1957 through 1982, t h e  Creche Committee sub- 
mitted a m i t t e n  application to t h e  Board seeking permission to dis- 
play its creche at Boniface Circle during the Christmas season; from 
1957 through 1972, the Board unanimously granted the Committee's 
applications; from 1973 through 1980, the Board granted the Commit- 
tee's applications, b u t  minority votes of abstention or denial marked 
t h e  grants. In 1981 a n d  1982, t h e  Board voted 4-3 to deny t h e  Com- 
mittee's requests to diiplay its creche at Boniface C i r ~ l e . ' ~  
Beginning in 1976 the Board of Trustees required the spon- 
sors of the Christmas exhibit to diiplay a sign indicating their 
sponsorship of the cr&che.14 In both 1979 and 1980, the Board of 
Trustees, while continuing to sanction display of the crache, rec- 
Other seasonal decorations seem to have accompanied the d c h e  displny during 
the years that the Scarsdale Trustees permitted the display. Id. a t  719. However, the 
McCreary plaintiffs apparently had nothing to do with them. Therefore, unlilie plaintias 
in other creche cases, advocates of the Scarsdale display could not and did not clnim thnt 
their diiplay was in any sense "softened" by related material. 
lo Id. a t  720. 
l1 The Scarsdale churches brought this action as the Creche Committee nnd not m 
individual houses of worship. The Cr6che Committee is a private unincorporated nssocia- 
tion of seven Catholic and Protestant churches in the Scarsdale area. Id. nt  718. 
l2 Id. a t  720. Though speculative, it is worth considering whether the court of np- 
peals would have taken a more stringent view of the Creche Committee's position had 
they not been joined by a Citizens' Group. Without the involvement of the Citizens' 
Group, the argument for display is more S t ra ighf f~~ard :  n group of Chrktian churches 
asserting the right to place a quintessentially religious symbol on public property to cele- 
brate a major religious holiday central to the beliefs of church membera This is a factor 
distinguishing McCreary from Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). See text accom- 
panying note 24 infra. 
l9 McCreary, 739 F.2d at 720. 
l4 Id. The sign read: 'This creche has been erected and mnintained solely by the 
Scarsdale Creche Committee, a private organization." During ornl nryment before the 
Supreme Court, Justice O'Connor expressed the view that the sign mitigated the dnnger 
t&t the public would attribute sponsorship of the creche to Scimdnle. Coumd for the 
Scarsdale Board of Trustees responded: "But i t  has the appearance of sp0~oF8hip .~  53
U.S.L.W. 3627 (Mar. 5. 1985). 
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ommended to the Creche Committee that they find another lo- 
cation in the future.'$ The trustees' repeated, strong recommen- 
dations reflected the growing divisiveness engendered by the 
creche. 
In December 1982, a group of Scarsdale residentsl0 sought 
permission to place a new, smaller creche in Boniface Circle to 
replace the one displayed in previous years.17 Their request was 
denied by the Board of Trustees, and these local residents (de- 
nominated the Citizens' Group) brought an action against Scars- 
dale and its trustees in February 1983?8 In April 1983, following 
the denial of its application to place the creche in Boniface Cir- 
cle for the 1983 Christmas season, the Creche Committee also 
sued Scarsdale and the trustees.19 Because the two actions were 
virtually identical, United States District Judge Stewart consoli- 
dated them.20 The defendants argued that placement of the 
creche violated the establishment clause of the first amendment. 
The district judge agreed and found in favor of Scarsdale and its 
trustees on all issues.21 Both the Creche Committee and the Citi- 
zens' Group appealed to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit 
reversed the district court and remanded "for the entry of an 
injunction prohibiting the Village from relying on the establish- 
ment clause as a reason for prohibiting the erection of a creche 
l6 McCreary, 739 F.2d a t  721. In 1979, the Scarsdale authorities "strongly recom- 
mended" and in 1980 "strongly urge[d]" that the creche be relocated to private property. 
I t  must be assumed, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the trustees were discharg- 
ing their duties in the public interest. There is no indication that any of the trustees who 
questioned placement of the creche on public property were subject to political pressure. 
Although they did not deal directly with the issue, the reported district and circuit court 
opinions permit the inference that the Scarsdale community generally supported the 
trustees' actions. Otherwise, i t  is reasonable to assume that the Citizens' Group and the 
Creche Committee would have raised this point. On the other hand, the expression of 
rights protected by the first amendment must not depend on majority views. In the es- 
tablishment clause area, entanglement is not always conspicuous. Thus, the apparent 
lack of pretext for the trustees' recommendation does not by itself indicate the absence 
of impermissible entanglement. 
le Id. 
I7 Id. 
l8 Id. While the Citizens' Group sought damages in this action, i t  is clear that the 
gravamen of their demand for relief was an injunction enjoining Scarsdale authorities 
from preventing plaintiffs' use of Boniface Circle for their creche display. 
lo Id. a t  722. 
ao Id. 
Id. a t  722-23. "The case was tried on July 20, 1983, upon a record consisting en- 
tirely of stipulated facts, depositions, answers to interrogatories and documentary evi- 
dence." Id. a t  722. 
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at  Boniface Circle."** 
Circuit Judge Pierce, writing for the Second Circuit bench, 
noted that 
[tlhe principal issue before us on appeal is whether the VilIage's con- 
tent-based denials of the applications to display a creche for a period 
of approximately two weeks during the Christmas holiday season at 
Boniface Circle, a traditional public forum, were necessary in order to 
serve a compelling state interest of avoiding contravention of the es- 
tablishment clause of the Grst amendmenLm 
The court went on to find that "the district court at that time 
did not have the benefit of Lynch v. D~nrrelly,"~~ a crgche case 
recently decided by the Supreme Court. Further, the Second 
Circuit found that Judge Stewart had incorrectly analyzed 
Widmar v. Vin~ent*~ in reaching its conclusion. This author 
maintains that the district court did not misconstrue "Widmar 
in light of Lynch"26 and that, in any event, McCreary can and 
should be distinguished from Lynch. 
Lynch was decided by the Supreme Court in March 1984 by 
a five-to-four vote. This nationally publicized action involved an 
establishment clause challenge to the erection by a municipal 
corporation, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, of a Christ- 
mas display, including a crkche, in a private park." Like Scars- 
dale, Pawtucket had long permitted the Christmas display:8 and 
concern about its constitutionality had emerged only in recent 
years. Unlike Scarsdale, Pawtucket funded the display. The dis- 
trict court in Lynch upheld the plaintiffs' claims that the estab- 
lishment clause forbade such a municipdy sponsored and 
funded display of a c r b ~ h e . ~ ~  
29 Id. a t  730. While the Second Circuit ordered the V i e  not to rely on the e3tnb- 
lishment clause to block the creche display in the future, it is not clear whether there 
exists any additional basis for refusing to &ow the display of a religious 8!fmbOl on pub- 
lic property. Counsel for Scarsdale argued before the Supreme Court thnt the Second 
Circuit had, in effect, aflkmatively ordered display of the creche in Bonifnce Cirde. 53 
U.S.L.W. 3627 (Mar. 5, 1985). When Justice O'Connor objected to tbnt chnrncterhtion 
of the Second Circuit's opinion, counsel retorted. "None of the perties hive seen it  os 
anything else [than an order directing display of the creche]." Id. at  3628. 
hlccreary, 739 F.2d at  723. 
24 Id. (citing Lynch v. Domelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984)). 
O0 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
28 McCreary, 739 F.2d at  723. 
O1 Lynch, 465 U.S. a t  671. 
* Id. The record shows that the practice was ongoing for forty or more pars. Id. 
P9 DonneUy v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.RL 1981), afd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 
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By a narrow margin, the Supreme Court, in a somewhat me- 
andering opinion highlighted by references to irrelevant consid- 
eration~:~ overturned the district COUI%'S determination. The 
Court's main concern was the contextual setting of the creche 
rather than its innate identity as a religious symbol. Chief Jus- 
tice Burger, writing for the Court, stated that "[iln this case, the 
focus of our inquiry must be on the creche in the context of the 
Christmas season."31 Noting that the district court had con- 
cluded that the religious nature of a creche was in itself evidence 
of a lack of secular purpose, Chief Justice Burger continued: 
[The district court] rejected the City's claim that its reasons for in- 
cluding the creche are essentially the same as its reasons for sponsor- 
ing the display as a whole. The District Court plainly erred by focus- 
ing almost exclusively on the crBche. When viewed in the proper 
context of the Christmas Holiday season, it is apparent that, on this 
record, there is insufficient evidence to establish that the inclusion of 
the crBche is a purposeful or surreptitious effort to express some kind 
of subtle governmental advocacy of a particular religious message.8a 
While suggesting that challengers of government practices 
supposedly violative of the establishment clause must meet a 
new test by proving - almost literally - a holy conspiracy to 
advance or support religion, the Chief Justice also found that 
the Pawtucket practice had a secular purpose. "The display is 
sponsored by the City to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the 
origins of that H~ l iday . "~~  The Court did not address the ques- 
tion of whether the Pawtucket display highlighted the origin of 
Christmas as a religious event or of Christmas as an American 
19821, reu'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
30 See, e.g., 465 U.S. a t  674-78. In attempting to outline a basis for its decision, tho 
Court discussed a number of prior cases which have little or no relationship to  tho spo- 
cia1 establishment clause issues raised by the public display of religious symbols. Whilo 
the use of history may illuminate and help to explain an opinion, the Court's all too 
frequent harking back to the first Thanksgiving, id. a t  675, and its references to thu 
holdings of the National Gallery, id. a t  676, served no analytic purpose. 
Id. a t  679. Had the Pawtucket or the Scaredale creches featured the slogan "Koop 
Christ in Christmas," would the Court have examined the creche merely "in tho context 
of the Christmas season"? Probably only with the greatest difficulty. Such n sign would 
make the cr8che's innate religious symbolism unmistakable. What the Court ignorod, 
however, is that religious symbols traditionally convey spiritual values without n neod for 
words. Thus, its conclusion that "in the context of the Christmas season" nobody would 
give a religious interpretation to a creche is singularly anti-religious. 
52 Id. a t  680. 
Id. a t  681. 
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holiday for all. There is a differen~e.~' The Court's per curiam 
affirmance of McCreary did not shed further light on the 
question.36 
Widmar u. Vin~ent ,3~ upon which the district court in Mc- 
Creary also relied, presents different issues from those raised in 
Lynch. In Widmar, the University of Missouri a t  Kansas City 
had promulgated a regulation that denied to religious groups the 
use of campus facilities that were available to nonreligious 
groups. The defendant university, in an action brought by a 
number of students belonging to a religious organization, main- 
tained that its primary concern in enacting the challenged regu- 
lation was to ensure church-state separation pursuant to the 
mandate of the establishment clause.37 The Supreme Court, in 
rejecting the school's regulation, found that "an open-forum pol- 
icy, including nondiscrimination against religious speech, would 
have a secular purpose and would avoid entanglement with reli- 
g i ~ n . " ~ ~  The Supreme Court further noted that "an open forum 
" The Supreme Court's reasoning in Lynch does nothing to resolve the problem of n 
municipality that uses a display to celebrate the true origins of Chriitmns. In thnt case, 
the municipality is certainly engaged in impermissible conduct. If, on the other hnnd, the 
historical origins of the American celebration of Chriitmas are to be highlighted, n neu- 
tral museum-like exhibit would be constitutionally unobjectionnble, even if i t  included n 
cross or crgche. Such exhibits are by their nnture informntive nnd educntionnl, nnd this 
quality justifies governmental sponsorship of them. There is no indimtion, however, thnt 
the Pawtucket creche was intended to be informative. 
" Board of Trustees v. McCreary, 105 S. CL 1859 (1985) (per curinm). 
The Second Circuit relied heavily on Lynch when it  reversed the district court's 
finding that Scarsdale's content-based denials of the Cr+che Committee's nppliations 
were proper. See McCreary, 739 F.2d a t  724-27. The court's opinion emphns i i  Lynch's 
ruling that there was no primary advancement of religion even if Pnwtucket nppeved to 
have aligned itself with Christianity by permitting the creche diiplny on municipal prop- 
erty. Id. a t  727. 
" 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
Id. at 270. Many sectarian groups on college campuses today nre viewed either ns 
"fringe" organizations or, in some instances, as heretical by observers of trnditionnl reli- 
gious practices. In Widmar, the university, probably correctly, sow itself ns n logid nnd 
inevitable target of litigation by those who opposed the use of university property by 
sectarian groups. The reluctance of universities to become involved in such litigntion has 
led to the adoption of regulations such as the University of hlissouri's, vihich prohibit 
sectarian group use of campus facilities. Because state university officinle nre more di- 
rectly accountable, generally, to legislators than they are to the public, i t  is underatnndn- 
ble if not commendable that they so often take a safe path. Hor;ever, the Constitution 
not only does not command them to do so, but on examinntion, i t  probably forbids them 
to do so. This is another factor militating against a broad applicntion of Widmar to 
McCreary. 
UL Id. a t  271-72 (citations omitted). 
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in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of State 
approval on religious sects or practi~es."~~ 
The significance of Widmar is that, in an institution of 
higher education, the mere use by religious student groups of 
facilities otherwise available to nonreligious student groups does 
not lead to an inference of governmental support for religion or 
for any particular religious group.'O While, without doubt, 
Widmar results in incidental benefits to those religious groups 
seeking the use of campus facilities, the Court has often stated 
that mere incidental benefits do not violate the Constitution." It 
is hard to read Widmar without coming to the conclusion that 
the Supreme Court was restricting its discussion to the issue of 
open access as it applied to state-sponsored institutions of 
higher learning.42 Widmar is cited in Lynch solely for the pro- 
position that indirect or incidental benefits to religion do not 
ips0 facto invalidate laws;4s in addition, the Court in Lynch re- 
ferred to Widmar only after discussing another case that more 
directly stood for the proposition it f~llowed."~ 
Before proceeding~~to a doctrinal analysis of the Second Cir- 
cuit's reliance on both Widmar and Lynch, it is useful to mark 
the clear factual distinctions between Widmar and Lynch, on 
the one hand, and McCreary on the other. Lynch, as previously 
indicated, involved the use of private property by a municipal- 
ity. In Lynch, the municipal but privately owned corporation ar- 
gued for the placement of the creche in a conspicuous public but 
privately owned place. The Pawtucket civic authorities argued 
that their display was essentially and inherently secular because 
it, together with other nonreligious symbols, marked the celebra- 
tion of a legal holiday.46 The Pawtucket display was maintained 
by the city, and the creche was only one part of a larger dis- 
30 Id. at 273. 
'O See id. at 274 ("[Aln open forum in a public university does not confer any impri- 
matur of State approval on religious sects or practices, just as it does not imply State 
approval of political views espoused by campus groups utilizing campus facilities."). 
See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 766, 
771 (1973) ("not every law that confers 'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' bonefit upon 
religious institutions is, for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid"). 
" See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n.14, 276 n.20. 
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683. 
** Id. (discussing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 
U.S. 756, 771 (1973)). 
' 6  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679-84. 
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play.46 Further, as Justice Blackmun pungently noted in his dis- 
senting opinion, a concomitant secular purpose of the crhche in 
Pawtucket was commercial exploitation of a religious holiday, a 
goal apparently subscribed to by the city a~thor i t ies .~~ 
Other aspects of the factual setting of McCreary are demon- 
strably and, from the standpoint of legal analysis, significantly 
different from Lynch. Proponents of the creche in Boniface Cir- 
cle were a coalition of churches and a group of citizens, some of 
whom were probably also members of the church group.J8 The 
record in McCreary does not indicate any serious argument 
raised by plaintiffs that a secular purpose was the main inspira- 
tion for the yearly creche display. Instead, as wil l  be discussed, 
the arguments of the pro-creche group in Scarsdale implicitly 
acknowledged the essentially religious nature of their display.JB 
Thus, in terms of factual distinctions alone, there was no 
strong basis, let alone an imperative, for the Second Circuit 
panel to apply Lynch to McCreary. The district court opinion in 
McCreary presented a clear statement of the facts upon which 
the court's judgment was predicated. Judge Stewart's opinion 
could have been, and should have been, assessed on the basis of 
relevant first amendment cases. Lynch, however, was not rele- 
vant because its facts differed so markedly from those of Illc- 
Creary. Consequently, it should not have been viewed as analyt- 
ically controlling. 
Widmar can also be distinguished factually from IllcCreary. 
The Second Circuit applied Widmar for its stated truism that 
denial of the university's establishment clause claim does not 
negate the possibility of reasonable time, place and manner reg- 
u l a t i o n ~ . ~ ~  However, the Second Circuit's reliance on Widmar 
Id. a t  671. Included in the display were, dong with Jesus, hlnry, and Joseph, 
"angels, shepherds, kings, and animals, all ranging in height from 5" to 5'." Id. 
Id. a t  726-27. See also Justice Brennan's dissent, in which be rejected Pnritucket's 
argument that commercial purposes were of su£Ecient seculnr ~ e i g b t  o overcome any 
establishment clause problem. Id. a t  698-701 (Brennnn, J., dissenting). 
A possible affinity of membership between the tsvo plnintiff groups should hnve 
been, but apparently was not, determined by the district court. 
Unlike those in Lynch, the theory of the creche advocates in hfcCreory atas thnt 
Scarsdale was legally bound not to discriminate on content-bnsed grounds in d c n ~ t i n g  
space in Boniface Circle. McCreory, 739 F.2d a t  722. The Scnrsdnle &e proponents 
argued that their right of access to the public area was no grenter and no less thm that 
of nonreligious affiliated org&tions. Id. a t  722-23. 
Id. a t  724. 
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for this principle was inapposite. The Widmar Court reassured 
universities that expanding equal access to religious groups in no 
way imperiled the institutions' basic right to control their own 
facilities, a control that is obviously vital when many groups 
seek the use of limited facilities. Non-content-focused time, 
place and manner regulation of access to university facilities is 
not a constitutional rule so much as it is a recognition of practi- 
calities and social reality.61 
No Widmar parallel can be found in McCreary. The creche 
had been displayed at  Boniface Circle for several decades, and 
the Citizens' Group and the Creche Committee both wished to 
continue using that, and no other, public facility.6a This is evi- 
dent from the fact that the creche sponsors had rejected re- 
quests, which later amounted to pleas by the Scarsdale authori- 
ties, that they relocate to private property. With respect to time, 
the creche sponsors were interested in displaying their exhibit 
only at  Christmas time, as they had in the past. Flexibility was 
not an issue in McCreary because of the nature of the exhibit; 
hence the free speech rules relating to manner do not apply. Mc- 
Creary, as Lynch, ineluctably comes to the question of creche or 
no creche. Unlike typical first amendment free speech disputes, 
which may allow for both negotiation and adjustment, McCreary 
forces the question as to the inherent permissibility of a creche 
on public property. Thus, Widmar is largely irrelevant, a fact 
the Second Circuit apparently did not comprehend. 
B. The Lemon Standard 
The Second Circuit, following its discussion of Lynch and 
6' There is also a clear difference between college administrators discharging their 
functions on campus and elected officials representing a political constituency. Whereas 
college administrators have fiduciary responsibilities to the students who attund those 
institutions, elected officials take an oath to uphold the Constitution and hence have a 
specific obligation to prevent first amendment abuses of religion. Moreover, there is a 
general recognition that institutions of higher education should not be regulated to the 
degree that, say, public high schools are. 
OB McCreary, 739 F.2d a t  721. The proponents of public display wanted to place the 
creche in Boniface Circle, probably because of the Circle's central location in the Scars- 
dale business district. Id. a t  719. On a t  least one occasion in 1981, the Creche Committee 
accepted an offer to place its display on the grounds of Scarsdale's Frog Prince Proper 
Restaurant. Id. a t  721. Apparently this was not a satisfactory solution for the Crilche 
Committee. There was no evidence that Committee members were willing to consider a 
location other than Boniface Circle. 
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Widmar as precedents, stated that the controlling case for ana- 
lyzing defendants' establishment clause argument in McCreary 
was Lemon v. K u r t ~ r n a n . ~ ~  As summarized by Judge Pierce: 
The Lemon test asks whether governmental conduct in an establish- 
ment-clause case has a secular purpose, whether the principal or pri- 
mary effect of that conduct advances or inhibits religion and whether 
the conduct will foster an excessive governmental entanglement with 
religion . . . . It is settled that if one prong of the test is breached, the 
challenged governmental conduct will violate the establishment clause 
. . . . The Lemon test generally has guided courts in the establish- 
ment-clause area. . . although the Supreme Court has warned that in 
this area it will not be bound by a single testM 
With respect to the first, or "secular purpose" prong of the 
Lemon test, the Second Circuit agreed with District Judge Stew- 
art that Widmar applied, a t  least insofar as that case considers 
"equal access for religious as well as nonreligious speech" to be 
an acceptable secular purpose.66 However, Widmar speaks in 
terms of pursuing a policy of an open forum to all comers, a 
concept especially suited to state educational institutions, which 
generally reflect a number of ethnic, economic, religious, politi- 
cal and social constituencies. Although not specifically defined, 
the forum atmosphere encouraged by Widmar is aimed a t  stim- 
ulating ideas and debate as part of the learning experience. A 
criiche, by contrast, is a symbol designed not to inspire debate 
but to awaken religious sentiment. Widmar's holding regarding 
speech, therefore, would not seem to apply to a religious symbol. 
A more significant issue is that of entanglement - the third 
prong of the Lemon test. In McCreary, the Second Circuit cor- 
rectly noted that "the Village's involvement here would be far 
less than the involvement' of Pawtucket, the sponsor of the 
creche in L y n ~ h . " ~ ~  The appellate court also supported the dis- 
trict court's finding that "the potential-political-divisiveness 
part of the [Lemon] excessive-entanglement prong was insuf5- 
* 403 U.S. 602 (1971). This case concerned state efforts to provide significant nid to 
pre-college parochial schools. In a landmark opinion, the Court analad the realpolitik 
of involving the state in the educational operations of sectarian schwls, and it struck 
down statutes of two states authorizing grants to parochial schwls for expenses incuned 
in providing instruction in secular subjects. 
McCreary, 739 F.2d at 725 (citations omitted). 
= Id. 
" Id. 
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cient to constitute an establishment-clause violation,"G7 The 
Second Circuit noted that "Lynch specifically limited the poten- 
tial-political-divisiveness part of the excessive-entanglement 
prong to cases involving direct subsidies to church-sponsored 
schools, colleges or other religious  institution^."^^ The author 
would argue that both the district and the appellate courts 
missed the real entanglement issue here. The so-called "poten- 
tial-political-divisiveness" that might be created is essentially 
the product of feelings about the open display of religious sym- 
bols on public land. The real divisiveness issue has to do with 
deep and genuine religious concerns that cannot be brushed 
aside by suggestions that divisiveness only arises in cases involv- 
ing government subsidies to religious institutions. The potential 
divisiveness acknowledged by the court becomes actual, 
profound and religious, in addition to being simply political, 
with the sanctioning of the display on the ground that no estab- 
lishment clause problem is p r e~en t ed .~~  
The Second Circuit noted in McCreary that "[iln reality, 
when evaluating an application for display of a creche, the Vil- 
lage will have to do no more than when evaluating any other 
request for access to its public proper tie^."^^ Would that it were 
so simple. By permitting public display of a symbol of seminal 
importance to a major religion, the Second Circuit is, in effect, 
virtually denying Scarsdale any right to reject any religious sym- 
Id. (citations omitted). 
Id. a t  726 (citations omitted). The political divisiveness issue is deceptively sim- 
ple. As the Court noted in Lemon, the mere existence of aid programs to sectarian 
schools awakens discord which, by itself, injects the state deeply into religious aITairs. 
The pluralistic nature of American society, coupled with a history of uneasy mutual ac- 
commodation of religious beliefs, thrusts potential political divisiveness forward as a test 
of entanglement. 
These are issues that will not die or simply go away. At most, denial of the right 
to use public property for the display of patently religious symbols results in attempts to 
have the original determination set aside or overruled. By contrast, granting permission 
to use public property would seem, a t  least impressionistically, to foment much greater 
divisiveness and to stoke a debate that the first amendment seeks to avoid. Every use of 
public property for the display of religious symbols engenders some form of entanglo- 
ment, albeit of a constitutionally insignificant level in some instances. The dangers of 
entanglement are often greater than the claimed benefits of permitting an intermingling 
of church and state. It is d i icul t  to believe that protecting the partly secular purpose of 
encouraging Christmas sales with a creche display is of the same level of magnitude ns 
ensuring church-state separation. 
60 739 F.2d a t  725. The Supreme Court's "affirmance" does nothing to curb the 
court's decision. 
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bol, whatever the message conveyed by the proposed display."' 
The religious divisiveness inherent in any pluralistic society, 
which is not necessarily a negative tension, thus can become a 
political battleground. Government may be neutral with regard 
to a particular faith or religious display, but under Lynch and 
McCreary it becomes seriously entangled in all the emotional is- 
sues that public discussion of religion engenders. Lemon was not 
intended to promote this dangerous result?= 
In analyzing the "primary effectyy prong of Lemon, the dis- 
trict court in McCreary found that placement of the creche in 
Scarsdale's Boniface Circle would, in the words of the reviewing 
court, "have the direct and immediate effect of advancing reli- 
g i ~ n . " ~ ~  Such an application of Lemon, of course, fatally under- 
mines any claim to the use of Boniface Circle for creche display. 
Here the Second Circuit rejected the district court's finding 
and applied Lynch, pointing out that Scarsdale rras less involved 
with the creche than Pawtucket, Rhode Island, which owned and 
managed the crgche in Lynch. However, Lynch involved Paw- 
tucket's policy to celebrate, with commercially beneficial over- 
tones, the Christmas s e a ~ o n . ~  Pawtucket strongly argued the ex- 
istence of a secular purpose for the display. Whether this 
practice aided religion impermissibly is beyond the scope of this 
Commentary. It should be noted, however, that neither a munic- 
ipal authority with a secular interest in encouraging Christmas 
cheers6 nor a commercial establishment underwrote the Boniface 
Circle creche. In contradistinction to Lynch, the supporters of 
the Scarsdale display are churches or their individual members. 
A fair reading of the decision in this case reflects the fact that the availnb'ity of 
Boniface Cicle to any group mandates its availab'ity under similnr cirmtance3 to all 
groups. While Scarsdale may, of course, refuse clearly obscene displn).e, all religious 
groups have been placed on an equal footing with all seculnr oqonizntions. The nnture of 
the message, as opposed to the form in which it is presented, a p p m  to ha bayond the 
control of the V i g e .  Thus, any religiously based principle may be proclnimed on public 
property. 
Indeed, the full thrust of Lemon is to prevent the very entanglement rihich the 
Second Cicuit permitted in McCreary. See, e.g., 403 U.S. nt 625 ("The Constitution 
decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the family, and the 
institutions of private choice, and that while some involvement md  entanglement are 
inevitable, lines must be drawn."). 
McCreary, 739 F.2d at  726. 
a Lynch, 465 U.S. a t  671. 
a There is no reason to believe that the Scarsdale authorities were m y  lea inter- 
ested in the welfare of business tenants than w:ere the Pnwtucket officinls. 
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It is suggested that when religiously motivated citizens and 
churches succeed in placing a religious symbol in a publicly 
owned park,s6 the applicability of Lynch becomes ephemeral and 
direct and immediate aid to religion as religione7 clearly 
emerges.6s 
While McCreary, as demonstrated, can be readily distin- 
Boniface Circle in Scarsdale is a park by designation but hardly by common defi- 
nition of the term. The author visited the park and found i t  to be no more than a small 
resting place in a busy commercial area. Even a small display would, of necessity, domi- 
nate the Circle, and would be visible from a large part of the commercial district. 
Without questioning the absolute right of the proponents of the creche in Scars- 
dale both to transmit a religious message and to publicly do so utilizing privatu property, 
the author emphasizes his belief that the display in Boniface Circle, a public place, con- 
veyed a clearly religious message. The author queried several storekeepers in the vicinity 
of the Circle. One described the creche as a "reminder" of the religious nature of Christ- 
mas, another suggested that the display "made people think about something other than 
gifts," and a third said that the display showed Scarsdale's "Christmas spirit." This sur- 
vey is hardly scientific, but even anecdotal accounts may display cr street sense, often 
absent from court opinions, about the reality of a long-standing practice. 
An argument not raised by Scarsdale is that the establishment clause forbids not 
only direct aid to religion but also hostility to religious precepts through governmental 
actions. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lynch raises an intriguing possibility for futuro 
litigation in the area of governmentally supported public displays of religious symbols. 
Quoting an expert witness for the City of Pawtucket who bolstered, before the district 
court, the city's argument that the creche had the secular purpose of encouraging people 
"to. . . let loose with their money," Donnelly v. Lynch, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1161 (D.R.I. 
19811, afd, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), the dissenting 
Justice in Lynch noted that 
[tlhe creche has been relegated to  the role of a neutral harbinger of tho holiday 
season, useful for commercial purposes, but devoid of any inherent meaning 
and incapable of enhancing the religious tenor of a display of which it is an 
integral part. The city has its victory - but i t  is a Pyrrhic one indeed. 
465 U.S. at  727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
It is reasonably clear that no sponsor of a creche display will or can admit that the 
creche is sufficiently secularized to be stripped of its inherent religious symbolism, This 
type of argument was successfully advanced in a New Mexico district court, but was 
ultimately reversed on appeal. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 528 F. Supp. 
919 (D.N.M. 1981). aff'd, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 27,19841, uacated and reversed sub 
nom. Friedman v. Board of County Comm'rs, No. 82-1064 (10th Cir. Dec. 26, 1985) (en 
banc). 
If the creche is to be viewed as a quintessentially religious symbol, cannot an mgu- 
ment be advanced that its publicly supported display, which encourages such secular 
objectives as boosting seasonal commercial sales, is hostile to the true purposes of reli- 
gion? This author suggests that the government's linking of a symbol sacred to many 
with holiday mercantilism is the k i d  of hostile entanglement with religion that is pro- 
hibited by Lemon and a long line of first amendment cases. These cases may pormit 
incidental benefits for religion through state action, see, e.g., Lynch, but they also re- 
strain the state from hurting the free exercise of religion except for compelling reasons. 
Advancing Christmas sales has not been considered such a compelling renson to date. 
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guished from Lynch, the ultimate doctrinal treatment of public 
displays of religious symbols, and in particular Christmas dis- 
plays, rests upon accepting one of two competing first amend- 
ment interpretations. The Lynch majority acknowledged its sen- 
sitivity to  possible entanglement,BD but an apparent lack of 
widespread public concern predisposed the Court to side with 
supporters of this display of religious symbolism. The sensitivity 
of the Lynch Court to the historical dimensions of the entangle- 
ment problem actually seems slight given Justice OYConnor's ob- 
servation, in her concurrence, that "the crbche display appar- 
ently caused no political divisiveness prior to the filing of this 
lawsuit, although Pawtucket had incorporated the crbche in its 
annual Christmas display for some years."'O The inability of the 
Court to recognize the extreme difEculty that many people have 
in openly opposing the publicly supported display of a symbol of 
the majoritarian creed does not diminish the actual support of 
and aid to religion that such displays represent. As Justice 
Blackmun noted in his dissenting opinion in Lynch, 
[tlhe import of the Court's decision is to encourage use of the creche 
in a municipally sponsored display, a setting where Christians feel 
constrained in acknowledging its symbolic meaning and non-Chris- 
tians feel alienated by its presence. Surely, this is a misuse of a sacred 
symbol. Because I cannot join the Court in denying either the force of 
our precedents or the sacred message that is at the core of the creche, 
I dissent . . . . 71 
The Second Circuit could have rationally supported Judge Stew- 
art in his initial determination that the Scarsdale crbche violated 
the establishment clause. Instead, the Second Circuit reversed, 
and its decision has not advanced the historic principles of the 
first amendment. 
C. Aid to Schools 
In Felton v. Secretary, United States Department of Edu- 
~ation,?~ the Second Circuit reversed the dismissal, by the 
60 465 U.S. at 687-88. 
70 Id. at 693 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
Id. at 727 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
739 F.2d 48 (2d Ci. 1984), a f d  sub nom. Aguilnr v. Felton, 105 S. Ct 3232 
(1985). See Comment, The Second Circuit and the Establishment Clause: Shoring up a 
Crumbling Wall, 51 BROOKLYN L REV. 642 (1985). 
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United States District Court for the Eastern District of New 
York, of a taxpayers' suit to enjoin the use of federal funds to 
send public school teachers into parochial institutions. The Su- 
preme Court a r m e d  the Second Circuit's decision.73 
Whatever the increased scope of state involvement with re- 
ligiohs groups or practices a t  the level of higher education might 
be," federal courts have remained constitutionally constrained 
and institutionally reluctant to relax the barriers where public 
school and high school children are inv~lved.?~ Faced with the 
inability of parochial schools to provide special services man- 
dated for public school students and with political pressure ex- 
erted by the parents of parochial school pupils, various legisla- 
tures have attempted to provide such services without crossing 
into constitutionally forbidden territory. Most have failed, as 
has New York's under the Second Circuit's analysis in Felton. 
The New York City Board of Education receives funds from 
the federal government through Title I of the Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act.?= This Act: 
declared it to be the policy of the United States to provide financial 
assistance to local educational institutions serving areas with concen- 
trations of children from low-income families to expand and improve 
their educational programs which contribute particularly to meeting 
the special education needs of educationally deprived children . . . . 77 
Educationally deprived children are not to be found solely in the 
public schools, and society must bear the responsibility for such 
deprivation, regardless of where these children attend school. 
Recognizing this, New York school authorities, since 1966, have 
sent "public school teachers and other professionals into reli- 
gious and other nonpublic schools to provide remedial instruc- 
tion and clinical and guidance  service^."^^ Writing for a unani- 
mous appellate bench, Judge Friendly recognized the positive 
results of New York's program, even though he ultimately found 
105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985). 
74 See, e.g., Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1972) (upholding federal grants for 
construction of secular facilities at church-a5liated colleges). 
" As the Supreme Court noted in Tilton, "[tlhere are generally significant diffor- 
ences between the religious aspects of church-related institutions of higher learning nnd 
parochial elementary and secondary schools." Id. at 685. 
" 20 U.S.C. $3 2701-3386 (1982). 
" Felton, 739 F.2d at 49. 
Id. 
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the program constitutionally imperrni~sible.?~ 
The establishment clause has been interpreted to mean that 
no entanglement with religion is permissible. However, not all 
government support services which incidentally benefit a reli- 
gious group or individual members of a religion are prohibited. 
Certainly no one today would argue that fire safety inspections 
of parochial schools or lectures to parochial school students by 
detectives on how to avoid sexual molestation violate the estab- 
lishment clause. Constitutional barriers arise as the state's in- 
volvement approaches either direct support of the teaching mis- 
sion of the parochial school or the provision of specialized 
teaching by regularly employed educational personneL Thus, by 
a bare majority, the Supreme Court has sanctioned a bus fare 
reimbursement program which benefited families of both public 
and parochial school children.s0 The Supreme Court has also 
sustained the lending of textbooks to parochial school students 
on the legally and technically rational but pragmatically irrele- 
vant theory that the books in question were "furnished a t  the 
request of the pupil and ownership remain[ed], a t  least techni- 
cally, in the State. Thus, no funds or books [were] furnished to 
parochial schools and the financial benefit [was] to parents and 
children, not to schools."81 
The Supreme Court has found unacceptable various 
schemes for parochial school salary supplementation for teachers 
who taught courses of nonsectarian content identical to those of- 
fered in public schoolss2 as well as schemes for purchasing of 
secular courses from sectarian  institution^.^^ The latter arrange- 
ment, of course, was nothing more than the funding of secular 
courses under a different form of contract. 
The Supreme Court's reluctance either to permit the use of 
public school teachers in parochial schools or to allow direct 
funding of teaching in such schools was well expressed in Lemon 
7e Id. at 49-50. (''We have no doubt that the program here under scrutiny hns done 
much good and that, apart from the Establishment Clnuse, the City could rensonnbly 
have regarded it as the most effective way to carry out the purpose3 of the Act") 
Everson v. Board of Educ, 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
Board of Educ V. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,243-44 (1968). Thnt a pupil in nn elemen- 
tary school would ask to borrow a book from the state sets n new level of nchievement for 
creators of legal fictions. 
" Felton, 739 F.2d at 55. 
Id. 
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v. Kurtzmans4 in a statement that continues to guide lower 
courts faced with new approaches by local educators and legisla- 
tors to provide services to parochial schools: 
A comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state surveillance 
will inevitably be required to ensure that these restrictions are obeyed 
and the First Amendment otherwise respected. Unlike a book, a 
teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and 
intent of his or her personal beliefs and subjective acceptance of the 
limitations imposed by the First Amendment. These prophylactic 
contacts will involve excessive and enduring entanglement between 
state and ch~rch.~" 
Simple distrust of the impact of a parochial atmosphere on a 
teacher, as well as an inability to determine whether the 
teacher's own religious beliefs and practices would be less re- 
strained in a po.rochial setting, have motivated the Supreme 
Court to decide on the side of caution. The degree of surveil- 
lance necessary to ensure that the first amendment is not vio- 
lated in these situations is not only costly and time-consuming, 
but also exacts a toll on teachers' morale and the integrity of 
their teaching function. 
Relying most heavily on Meek v. Pittenger,s6 the Second 
Circuit in Felton pointed out the fatal defects in New York's use 
of Title I monies.s7 In Meek, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Pennsylvania statute that articulated goals and methods similar 
to those of New York under the Title I program. Basically, only 
the source of funding was different.86 Proponents of the Penn- 
sylvania scheme argued that services to special students in paro- 
chial schools posed a minimal establishment clause problem and, 
indeed, did not foster the entanglement forbidden by the first 
amendment. Justice Stewart, author of the plurality opinion in 
Meek, responded by noting that "the likelihood of inadvertent 
fostering of religion may be less in a remedial arithmetic class 
than in a medieval history seminar, but a diminished probability 
of impermissible conduct is not sufEcient . . . . ,980 
LH 403 US. 602 (1971). 
Id. at 619 (emphasis added). 
421 U.S. 349 (1975). 
" 739 F.2d at 60. 
" Pennsylvania would have expended state monies to carry out the purposes of tho 
state's Act 194. Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-53 & n.2. 
Id. at 370-71. 
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The Supreme Court's decision in Wolman v. WalterOO also 
buttressed the Second Circuit's position in Felton. In Wolman, 
the Ohio statute under scrutinye1 provided for various profes- 
sional, but not pedagogic, diagnostic services to be performed on 
parochial school premises, as well as on private school grounds. 
However, the subsequent treatment of individual pupils mas to 
be conducted within public school facilities. The Court sustained 
the Ohio enactment, finding that the diierence between the role 
of the professional diagnostician and that of the teacher in itself 
insulated the state program from prohibited entanglemenLDa 
Judge Friendly in Felton thus found that the Supreme 
Court's prior rulings 
lead[] inescapably to the conclusion that public funds can be wed to 
afford remedial instruction or related counseling services to students 
in religious elementary and secondary schools only if such instruction 
or services are afforded at a neutral site off the premises of the reli- 
gious school.gS 
In his painstaking review of the defendant's contentions in 
Felton, Judge Friendly resisted defendants' attempts to separate 
the New York program from its ill-fated predecessors on the ba- 
sis of how the New York plan operated.e4 Many of the defend- 
ants' contentions regarding the involvement of religion with re- 
medial teaching were highly speculative.e6 It is precisely the 
need to employ such speculation to support the constitutionality 
of this type of program that, in itself, suggests establishment 
clause problems. 
Judge Friendly stressed an important point when he ob- 
* 433 U.S. 229 (1977). 
81 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 3 3317.06 (Page Supp. 1976). 
Wolman, 433 US. a t  242. Justice Blackmun likened the role of the dingnosticinn 
of psychological or learning disabilities to that of physicians, dentists, and optometrists. 
Approval of these and related state services for pa roch i  school children, to be delivered 
on the premises of the religious schools, was granted in Lemon. Id. 
Felton, 739 F.2d a t  64. 
~4 Id. a t  65-68. The arguments essentially go to the scope and ndequncy of supen5- 
sion of public school teachers in the parochial setting. The city nlso oryed k t  because 
no harm had been done in the past, this somehow removed the practice from judicinl 
S~lUtiny. 
85 It is doubtful that any amount of research, s ta t i s t id  or empirical, am remove the 
presumption of entanglement found in the Supreme Court's line of cases on aid to pao- 
chid schools. The Court has recognized that tenchers can and may respond to the envi- 
ronment of the parochial schooL No amount of supervision, however ~ i e l l  intended, is 
likely to eliminate these risks. 
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served that the "appellees' arguments ignore the symbolic signif- 
icance of the regular appearance of public school teachers in reli- 
gious s~hools ."~~ Unlike diagnosticians, whose occasional 
presence - even when repeated by the same personnel - raises 
no authority issues in the minds of children because their mis- 
sion is clearly discrete, pupils cannot be expected to recognize 
role differences among teachers. The existence of a public versus 
a private payroll is of no importance to young children. What is 
real to them, however, is the regular presence in a parochial 
school of individuals whose behavior, demeanor, and expecta- 
tions identify them as teachers. In the vernacular of New York 
streets, pupils can "make" a teacher, regardless of his or her 
source of income, and this starts public education down the ill- 
defined but nonetheless slippery slope of prohibited church- 
state entanglement. 
As the Second Circuit panel noted in its conclusion, after all 
the arguments raised in favor of New York's practice are scruti- 
nized, the ultimate reality is that the Felton defendants did not 
ask the court to distinguish the case from its predecessors but 
rather asked it "to say that Meek was wrongly decided."07 This 
the court prudently declined to do. Felton was rightly decided in 
an especially well-reasoned opinion which should be cited fre- 
quently in this and other circuits as new plans to aid parochial 
school children are, inevitably, tested in the courts against the 
language, interpretation and application of the establishment 
clause. The Supreme Court's affirmance of FeltonQB ensures that 
the Second Circuit's analysis will have a deserved impact on 
those cases. 
D. And Lastly, Reverend Moon 
The Second Circuit, in United States v. Sun Myung 
Moon,BB upheld the conviction of the Reverend Sun Myung 
Moon on charges stemming from his filing of false income tax 
returns. The case was a significant Second Circuit decision 
chiefly because Rev. Moon is a controversial and wealthy figure. 
739 F.2d at 67. 
Id. at 72. 
Aguilar v. Felton, 105 S. Ct. 3232 (1985) (closely tracking the Second Circuit 
opinion). 
718 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2344 (1984). 
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Many of the issues raised in Judge Cardamone's opinion,'OO as 
well as in Judge Oakes' dissent,'O1 are beyond the scope of this 
Commentary. However, the appellants did raise several constitu- 
tional issues worthy of brief review. 
Moon alleged prejudicial error based on jury instructions 
that allowed the jury to find that if Moon used certain monies 
from a bank account for his o m  purposes, he could not claim 
that the funds were in trust for his church.loa Moon argued that 
only the church's o m  definition of a church use was constitu- 
tionally acceptable and binding on the jury.loS The Second Cir- 
cuit majority disposed of these arguments, pointing out that 
[tlhe First Amendment does not insulate a church or its members 
from judicial inquiry when a charge is made that their activities vio- 
late a penal statute. Consequently, in this criminal proceeding the 
jury was not bound to accept the Unification Church's definition of 
what constitutes a religious use or purp~se.'~ 
Moon also raised what the appellate court termed the "so- 
called 'Messiah' defense."lo5 The gravamen of this claim was 
that Moon, as viewed theologically by his followers, mas insepa- 
rable from Moon as a legal, natural person.lo6 This claim fared 
no better than his other novel constitutional theories. 
An important first amendment case, In re Herald Co.,"" 
brought the Second Circuit in line with the Third, Fifth, and 
loo Many issues of substantive criminal law, e.g., sufficiency of the evidence as to 
Moon's tax offenses, id. at 1219-23, and propriety of jury instructions with regard to 
Moon's criminal intent, id. at 1228, were raised in the appeal. 
lo' The dissent is largely concerned with issues of New York trust law. Circuit Judge 
Oakes argued that the trial judge's charge to the jury "contnined errors which, because 
they were on the crucial issue of the case [whether hloon or the Church ovmed banlr 
accounts and stock], must be considered prejudicial." Id. n t  1245. His disputntions cen- 
tered on: the weight to be given to the donor's intent, id.; whether n " 'denr and unnm- 
biguous' intent is necessary to create a charitable trust," id. at 1246; and whether it r;as 
necessary for the jury to find that the Church had a "specific orgnnizationnl structure" rn 
as to be viewed as a beneficiary, id. 
loo Id. at 1226. 
los Id. 
IM Id. at 1227. 
lQ6 Id. 
log Id. at 1227-28. 
734 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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Ninth Circuits108 and evolving free press doctrine by recognizing 
"that the First Amendment extends some degree of public ac- 
cess to a pretrial suppression hearing."10B Herald Co. arose from 
the federal prosecution of Michael Klepfer, who was charged 
with making false statements to government investigators and 
obstructing justice.l1° 
Klepfer sought to suppress oral statements made to federal 
investigators,ll1 and also moved to "exclude the public from the 
hearing on the suppression motion."l12 The government opposed 
Klepfer's motion for a closed hearing, stating that 
[tlhe government does not feel that there is any greater threat posed 
by the continuance of an open hearing in a case that's already been 
made public where there's been a public indictment, there ha[ve] been 
newspaper articles and conclusions drawn from the articles and the 
public proceedings so far . . . . 11s 
Chief Judge Munson, the trial judge, permitted an attorney for a 
newspaper published by The Herald Company to argue against 
the motion for exclusion.114 Counsel was somewhat handicapped 
by the fact that he did not know, nor could he learn, Klepfer's 
reasons for seeking exclusion.116 Judge Munson then granted the 
motion, finding that "the potential for harm to this defendant, 
as well as the tainting of any future proceedings by pretrial dis- 
closures, I think outweighs the right of the public a t  this time 
and the press to attend this hearing."lI6 The Herald Company 
appealed both the suppression and sealing of the hearing tran- 
script and related papers, and the court's refusal to provide it, 
and the public, with "prior notice of any further actions to ex- 
Io8 United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354 (5th Cir. 1983) (first amendment right of 
access applies to pretrial bail reduction hearings); United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 650 
(3d Cir. 1982) (public has first amendment right of access to pretrial suppression, duo 
process, and entrapment hearings); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 
1982) (policies underlying public's first amendment right of access to criminal proceed- 
ings also apply to voir dire). 
log Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 99. 
110 Id. at 95. 
Id. 
' I X  Id. 
'la Id. 
1' Id. 
116 Id. 
Id. at 96. 
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clude the public from proceedings."l17 
In its review of prior Supreme Court pretrial closure 
cases?l8 the Second Circuit majority119 found that while closure 
had been permitted in one instance, it had been found improper 
in three others. Circuit Judge N e m a n  noted that "the increas- 
ing reliance by a majority of the Justices upon the functional 
argument strongly suggests that we should recognize some de- 
gree of First Amendment access to pretrial  proceeding^."'^^ The 
court further noted: 
It makes little sense to recognize a right of public a c w  to criminal 
courts and then limit that right to the trial phase of a criminal pro- 
ceeding, something that occurs in only a small fraction of criminal 
cases. There is a significant benefit to be gained from public obsewa- 
tion of many aspects of a criminal proceeding, including pretrial sup- 
pression hearings that may have a decisive effect upon the outcome of 
a pro~ecution.'~~ 
Having determined that some right of access to pretrial pro- 
ceedings exists, the Second Circuit then formulated the limits of 
that right. The court refused "to frame a test for closure of a 
pretrial suppression hearing that incorporates the rigorous First 
Amendment standards associated with abridgement of free ex- 
pressi~n."'~~ Judge Nemman observed that, historically, protect- 
ing free speech has been the chief concern of the first amend- 
ment, and that while a first amendment right of access has also 
been developed, it cannot be equated with the central and fun- 
damental right of freedom of speech.'2g 
1' Id. 
118 Id. (citing Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 US. 501 (1984); Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Nen.~ipnpers, Inc v. 
V i i a ,  448 U.S. 555 (1980); Gannett Co. v. De Pasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979)). 
'lo Circuit Judges Newman and Winter. District Judge hfnchfnhon, sitting by desig- 
nation, dissented. 
ltO 734 F.2d a t  98. 
lX1 Id. 
lt5 Id. a t  100. 
lPS Id. Little support is given by Judge Newman for his statement thnt "[tlo claim n 
value in access to information, even information concerning signitimnt governmental ac- 
tivities, comparable to the value of freedom of expression, is to ignore 200 years of Fiit 
Amendment jurisprudence." Id. In any real sense, however, first nmendment doctrine 
was born in the courts only in the second decode of the present century. Legal history 
aside, the dominant reality today is that access to informntion, especinlly informntion 
about government and its activities, is an indispensable prerequisita to any meaningful 
free speech about such activities. The right to petition government for n redress of griev- 
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The circuits do not agree on this issue. The Third Circuit 
will grant a closure motion only on a strong showing that "other 
means will be insufficient to preserve the defendant's rights and 
that closure is necessary to protect effectively against the per- 
ceived harm."124 The Fifth Circuit requires evidence of "likely 
prejudice to a fair trial"125 which cannot be cured adequately by 
alternatives to closure. Under these circumstances, the Fifth Cir- 
cuit will permit closure if it "will probably be effective" in 
preventing prejudice to a fair trial.'26 The Ninth Circuit has 
adopted Justice Blackmun's ~tandard,'~' as articulated in Gan- 
nett Co. v. De P a s q ~ a l e , ' ~ ~  whereby closure must be "strictly 
and inescapably necessary to protect the fair-trial guarantee."laD 
The standard adopted by the Second Circuit to protect the 
limited right of free access to suppression hearings is essentially 
a middle-of-the-road approach that rejects the far-reaching stan- 
dard of Justice Blackmun. Noting that closure is not a step to be 
taken lightly,'s0 the Second Circuit articulated a cautiously 
worded standard to be applied by trial judges: 
[Closure] should be invoked only upon a showing of a significant risk 
of prejudice to the defendant's right to a fair trial or of danger to 
persons, property, or the integrity of significant activities entitled to 
confidentiality, such as ongoing undercover investigations or detection 
devices . . . . Though we do not believe that closure must be found to 
be the least restrictive means possible to avoid the perceived risk, the 
trial judge must consider alternatives and reach a reasoned conclusion 
that closure is a preferable course to follow to safeguard the interests 
at  issue. The closure should be tailored to the circumstances of the 
perceived risk . . . . The trial judge must articulate the basis for any 
ances similarly requires information, and so much of what government does today will 
not come to public attention unless there is a positive and legally enforceable right of 
access. Court proceedings, not infrequently a t  the pretrial stage, often provido enticing 
clues or outright revelations about official acts that the public should know about. This is 
not to suggest that government does not have a right to keep secrets or that closure of 
pretrial proceedings always violates the first amendment. Rather, there are compelling 
practical reasons that the concept of free access should be elevated to the same constitu- 
tional dimension as free speech and should be subject to the same restrictions ns speech. 
la' United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 561-62 (3d Cir. 1982). 
la& United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 365 (5th Cir. 1983). 
la6 Id. 
Is' United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162 (9th Cir. 1982). 
"' 443 U.S. 368 (1979). 
Id. a t  440. 
ISo Herald Go.. 734 F.2d a t  100. 
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closure order . . . . 131 
The standard articulated by the Second Circuit will, in most in- 
stances, provide the same resolution of a closure question as the 
application of the Blackmun-formulated stricter standard fol- 
lowed by the Ninth Circuit. However, the Second Circuit's posi- 
tion does allow for substantial discretion by trial judges faced 
with motions for closure. The caution with which the Second 
Circuit majority approached this issue is apparent throughout 
its decision in Herald Co., and may have been a specifically tai- 
lored counterbalance to the dissent.'s2 While the decision is 
functionally and doctrinally an advance for Second Circuit first 
amendment jurisprudence, this author suggests that the Second 
Circuit majority placed undue reliance on vague and unsup- 
ported statements of first amendment history and gave ins&% 
cient weight to the realities of contemporary judicial 
proceedings. 
Justice Blackmun's test in Gannett Co. v. De P a ~ q r u r l e ~ ~ ~  is 
not, as Judge N e m a n  stated, a "slightly more rigorous stan- 
dard,"'* but is instead a fundamental recognition of the central- 
ity of pretrial procedures in contemporary criminal litigation. 
Pretrial proceedings often determine whether further proceed- 
ings wil l  be held. Official conduct, and too often misconduct, 
surfaces at pretrial proceedings, most especially a t  suppression 
hearings. These are matters of great public interest which, as a 
practical matter, only the news media can cover effectively. Un- 
like Justice Blackmun, however, the Second Circuit stopped just 
a bit too short of recognizing this reality. 
lS1 Id. (citations omitted). 
I* The dissent urged a broad understanding of the reasons for closure, ag., histori- 
cal practice, prejudicial pretrial publicity, and potential for unrensomble delny, id. nt 
10406 (MacMahon, J., dissenting), while ignoring the contempomry shift nwny from clo- 
sure by the other circuits. Id. at 96-100 (hlachlahon, J.. dissenting). 
lss 443 U.S. 368,440 (1979). 
Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 99. 
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